Tom Cotton Goes Nuclear: The Neocon’s Obama Derangement Syndrome Reaches New Heights

Tom Cotton (Credit: AP/Danny Johnston)
Tom Cotton (Credit: AP/​Danny Johnston)

Right-wing Obama hatred and hawk­ish for­eign pol­i­cy instincts can clash in all sorts of col­or­ful, unex­pect­ed ways, but cred­it to fresh­man sen­a­tor and not­ed piece of work Tom Cotton for this lat­est twist: neo­con­ser­v­a­tive Neville Chamberlain apol­o­gism. If your goal is to describe President Obama as the most naïve ama­teur in the his­to­ry of for­eign pol­i­cy, that means you have to mas­sage Chamberlain’s rep­u­ta­tion ever so slight­ly. (Another idea would be to find a more applic­a­ble ana­logue to Obama’s Iran pol­i­cy than Munich 1938, but we can only ask for so much his­tor­i­cal flex­i­bil­i­ty from neoconservatives.)

Cotton flesh­es out the line first pro­vid­ed by Sen. Mark Kirk — that the Obama admin­is­tra­tion is worse than Chamberlain — in a new inter­view with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg. Lest any­one think that was just an over-the-top expres­sion of frus­tra­tion from Kirk, Cotton is prov­ing that they intend to work and expand this argu­ment. It’s not a new strain of thought to sug­gest that his­to­ry has giv­en Chamberlain an unnec­es­sar­i­ly bum rap, but it’s rare to see a neo­con­ser­v­a­tive like Tom Cotton mak­ing it. That’s where hyper­bol­i­cal­ly anti-Obama pos­tur­ing brings us today.

Wait,” a shocked, SHOCKED Jeffrey Goldberg asks Cotton, “this is the 1930s to you?” Is it ever not?

Cotton: It’s unfair to Neville Chamberlain to com­pare him to Barack Obama, because Neville Chamberlain’s gen­er­al staff was telling him he couldn’t con­front Hitler and even fight to a draw — cer­tain­ly not defeat the German mil­i­tary — until prob­a­bly 1941 or 1942. He was oper­at­ing from a posi­tion of weak­ness. With Iran, we nego­ti­at­ed pri­vate­ly in 2012 – 2013 from a posi­tion of strength, not a posi­tion of weak­ness. The secret nego­ti­a­tions in Oman. This ulti­mate­ly led to the Joint Plan of Action of November 2013. So we were nego­ti­at­ing from a posi­tion of strength — not just inher­ent mil­i­tary strength of the United States com­pared to Iran, but also from our strate­gic position.

Neville Chamberlain oper­at­ed from a posi­tion of weak­ness and had lit­tle choice but to give all the good­ies to ol’ Hitler. Obama is oper­at­ing from a posi­tion of strength, and yet he still is giv­ing all the good­ies to Hitler, or what­ev­er the new Hitler thing is. Cotton can­not even bring him­self to call the pre­lim­i­nary frame­work a “deal.” He refers to it again and again as a “list of con­ces­sions.” When Goldberg tries to bring up just one of the con­ces­sions that Iran is mak­ing — reduc­ing “their stock­pile from 10,000 kilo­grams to 300 kilo­grams of high­ly enriched ura­ni­um” — Cotton brush­es it aside as, well, we don’t real­ly know the par­tic­u­lars of that and besides, they are lying liars. He sim­i­lar­ly dis­miss­es the pro­vi­sion that the under­ground cen­ter at Fordow won’t be enrich­ing ura­ni­um. It would have been nice if Goldberg had made him respond to the fact that Iran went into nego­ti­a­tions hop­ing to main­tain a capac­i­ty of 50,000 cen­trifuges and will walk away with 6,000, pend­ing a final agreement.

Sometimes dur­ing the course of a long con­ver­sa­tion, a politi­cian will for­get that he’s staked out a sur­pris­ing posi­tion — defend­ing Neville Chamberlain, for exam­ple — and revert back to a con­tra­dic­to­ry but famil­iar com­fort zone. And sure enough, by the end of the con­ver­sa­tion, Cotton is back to trash­ing Chamberlain for the “dis­hon­or” he showed at Munich:

Cotton: The world prob­a­bly wish­es that Great Britain had rebuilt its defens­es and stopped Germany from reoc­cu­py­ing the Rhineland in 1936. Churchill said when Chamberlain came back from Munich, ‘You had a choice between war and dis­hon­or. You chose dis­hon­or and you will there­fore be at war.’ And when President Obama likes to say, ‘It’s this deal or war,’ I would dis­pute that and say, ‘It’s this deal or a bet­ter deal through stronger sanc­tions and fur­ther con­fronta­tion with [Iran’s] ambi­tions and aggres­sion in the region.’ And if it is mil­i­tary action, I would say it’s more like Operation Desert Fox or the tanker war of the 1980s than it is World War II. In the end, I think if we choose to go down the path of this deal, it is like­ly that we could be fac­ing nuclear war.

Helloooo, final sen­tence! Because that’s the oth­er thing about this inter­view, is how Cotton mat­ter-of-fact­ly drops hints about the impend­ing nuclear war to which the Obama admin­is­tra­tion is set­ting the world on a path. This is anoth­er area where Cotton takes con­trast­ing posi­tions depend­ing on the moment: is Iran a ratio­nal actor, or is it not? Is it con­cerned about self-preser­va­tion or is it not?

For the most part Cotton treats Iran as a ratio­nal actor. “They react to threats that are severe enough,” he says. To him that means not just pre­serv­ing sanc­tions, but the cred­i­ble threat of mil­i­tary action if Iran doesn’t tear apart its nuclear pro­gram. Even though the Obama admin­is­tra­tion has been say­ing con­sis­tent­ly for years that it will take mil­i­tary action against Iran if it isn’t will­ing to nego­ti­ate, Cotton doesn’t buy this, because Tom Cotton doesn’t like Barack Obama.

But then, because the imagery of a mush­room cloud is too effec­tive to pass up, Cotton reverts to treat­ing Iran like an irra­tional actor, one intent for reli­gious pur­pos­es on nuk­ing Israel (and thus bring­ing about the instant, retal­ia­to­ry nuclear destruc­tion of itself.) Here, too, Cotton finds him­self defend­ing an unlike­ly part­ner — the Soviet Union! — as a con­ve­nient con­trast to Iran. He argues that ”we could always count on the Soviet lead­er­ship to be con­cerned about nation­al sur­vival in a way that I don’t think we can count on a nuclear-armed Iranian lead­er­ship to be sole­ly con­cerned about nation­al sur­vival.” Why not? Well, some­thing about how Iranians say a lot of mean things. “I think it” — Iran obtain­ing a nuclear bomb — “will prob­a­bly lead to the det­o­na­tion of a nuclear device some­where in the world, if not out­right nuclear war.”

The argu­ment of how Iran would act as a nuclear pow­er is hypo­thet­i­cal, because there’s a deal being nego­ti­at­ed right now that would pre­vent it from becom­ing a nuclear pow­er, and nei­ther Cotton nor his fel­low crit­ics are able to offer a clear expla­na­tion for their fre­quent asser­tion that this deal ensures Iran gets the bomb. But hey, let’s enter­tain it any­way. What’s an argu­ment for Iran becom­ing a nuclear pow­er and this lead­ing to nuclear war? Maybe that Iran going nuclear wouldn’t stop the likes of Tom Cotton and his fel­low hawks from pur­su­ing Iranian régime change. That would be a provoca­tive recipe for fire­works, indeed, and it’s some­thing that leads me to believe that the Obama admin­is­tra­tion is seri­ous when it says that it will do any­thing to pre­vent Iran from get­ting a bomb. Can we be trust­ed to be the ratio­nal actor?
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