Projecting The Problem: How America’s Drug War Targets Other Nations

For more than half a cen­tu­ry, the United States has framed the glob­al drug trade as an exter­nal threat — an inva­sion of nar­cotics cross­ing its bor­ders from for­eign lands, car­ried by crim­i­nal orga­ni­za­tions root­ed in dis­tant soil. In doing so, it has con­struct­ed a for­eign pol­i­cy archi­tec­ture that relies heav­i­ly on coer­cion, mil­i­ta­riza­tion, and the implic­it or explic­it threat of vio­lence against oth­er nations. This pos­ture rests on a cen­tral claim: that ille­gal drugs “arrive” in America from else­where, and that the pri­ma­ry respon­si­bil­i­ty for stop­ping them lies beyond U.S. bor­ders. Yet this fram­ing obscures a more fun­da­men­tal real­i­ty. Drugs flow into the United States because Americans buy them. Without domes­tic demand, there would be no transna­tion­al sup­ply chains. By focus­ing out­ward — on pro­duc­ers, traf­fick­ers, and for­eign gov­ern­ments — rather than inward on its own pat­terns of con­sump­tion, the United States has exter­nal­ized blame and export­ed instability.
The log­ic of coer­cion has deep roots in the pol­i­cy frame­work com­mon­ly referred to as the War on Drugs. Beginning in the ear­ly 1970s and inten­si­fy­ing through sub­se­quent admin­is­tra­tions, U.S. lead­ers por­trayed nar­cotics as a nation­al secu­ri­ty threat. This rhetor­i­cal move had pro­found impli­ca­tions. Once drugs were defined as a secu­ri­ty issue rather than pri­mar­i­ly a pub­lic health con­cern, the tools of response shift­ed accord­ing­ly: from treat­ment and pre­ven­tion toward inter­dic­tion, sur­veil­lance, mil­i­tary aid, and puni­tive enforce­ment. Foreign nations became front­line com­bat­ants in what Washington char­ac­ter­ized as a glob­al war.
Consider the pres­sure applied to coun­tries such as Mexico and Colombia and even tiny Jamaica with its tiny mar­i­jua­na fields , when com­pared to mas­sive mar­i­jua­na pro­duced in states like California, Arizona and oth­ers. For decades, these for­eign nations have faced intense diplo­mat­ic and eco­nom­ic lever­age from Washington, often tied to anti-drug coöper­a­tion. In Colombia, the late-1990s ini­tia­tive known as Plan Colombia com­bined bil­lions of dol­lars in U.S. mil­i­tary assis­tance with counter-nar­cotics and coun­terin­sur­gency oper­a­tions. While framed as a part­ner­ship, it oper­at­ed under sig­nif­i­cant asym­me­try: U.S. fund­ing and polit­i­cal back­ing were con­tin­gent upon aggres­sive erad­i­ca­tion cam­paigns and secu­ri­ty reforms aligned with American pri­or­i­ties. Aerial fumi­ga­tion of coca crops, mil­i­tary oper­a­tions in rur­al areas, and expand­ed secu­ri­ty forces were jus­ti­fied as nec­es­sary to stem cocaine flows northward.
Jamaica has had it’s fair share of that process with its nation­al air­line being fined huge sums of mon­ey by the United States because cor­rupt secu­ri­ty per­son­nel allowed mar­i­jua­na onto the nation­al airline.
Similarly, in Mexico, U.S.-backed secu­ri­ty ini­tia­tives have fueled a mil­i­ta­rized approach to car­tel vio­lence. Just a day ago Cartel vio­lence flared in Mexico after the killing of an alleged major drug king­pin. The log­ic has been con­sis­tent: if drugs are enter­ing the United States, the source coun­tries must inten­si­fy enforce­ment. Aid pack­ages, train­ing pro­grams, and intel­li­gence-shar­ing arrange­ments have often come with clear expec­ta­tions. Failure to meet U.S. bench­marks can car­ry con­se­quences, from reduc­tions in assis­tance to diplo­mat­ic cen­sure. The imbal­ance of pow­er ensures that such “coöper­a­tion” fre­quent­ly resem­bles coer­cion depend­ing on the admin­is­tra­tion in power.
This dynam­ic is rein­forced by U.S. domes­tic law, includ­ing cer­ti­fi­ca­tion process­es that eval­u­ate whether for­eign gov­ern­ments are doing enough even with mea­ger or non-exist­ing resources to com­bat drug pro­duc­tion and traf­fick­ing. The under­ly­ing mes­sage is unmis­tak­able: align your poli­cies with Washington’s anti-drug pri­or­i­ties or risk eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal reper­cus­sions or worse, hav­ing your nation bombed and your leader kid­napped. In effect, the United States projects its inter­nal drug anx­i­eties out­ward, trans­form­ing sov­er­eign nations into instru­ments of its domes­tic enforce­ment strategy.
Yet this strat­e­gy side­steps the cen­tral dri­ver of the drug trade: American con­sump­tion. The United States remains one of the largest mar­kets for ille­gal nar­cotics in the world. Cocaine, hero­in, metham­phet­a­mine, and syn­thet­ic opi­oids do not spon­ta­neous­ly migrate north­ward; they are pulled by demand. Traffickers respond to price sig­nals and prof­it mar­gins cre­at­ed by U.S. buy­ers. As long as mil­lions of Americans are will­ing to pur­chase illic­it sub­stances, sup­ply net­works will adapt, no mat­ter how many hectares of coca are erad­i­cat­ed or how many king­pins are arrested.
The dis­junc­tion is stark. On one hand, the United States pres­sures for­eign gov­ern­ments to deploy sol­diers, con­duct raids, and uproot crops — often desta­bi­liz­ing frag­ile regions. On the oth­er hand, it strug­gles to address the socioe­co­nom­ic, psy­cho­log­i­cal, and cul­tur­al fac­tors that fuel domes­tic drug use. Poverty, untreat­ed men­tal ill­ness, chron­ic pain, social iso­la­tion, and the prof­it-dri­ven excess­es of seg­ments of the phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal indus­try all con­tribute to America’s com­plex rela­tion­ship with intox­i­cants. The opi­oid cri­sis, in par­tic­u­lar, exposed how deeply root­ed domes­tic demand can be — even when the ini­tial dri­vers were legal pre­scrip­tions rather than smug­gled contraband.
By treat­ing drugs pri­mar­i­ly as a for­eign threat, U.S. pol­i­cy obscures uncom­fort­able truths about its own soci­ety. It is polit­i­cal­ly eas­i­er to blame for­eign car­tels than to con­front struc­tur­al inequal­i­ty, gaps in health­care, inad­e­quate addic­tion treat­ment, and cul­tur­al pat­terns of sub­stance use. It is sim­pler to deploy the Drug Enforcement Administration abroad than to fun­da­men­tal­ly reimag­ine domes­tic drug policy.

Externalizing the prob­lem shifts pub­lic atten­tion away from sys­temic reform at home.
Moreover, coer­cive for­eign pol­i­cy can pro­duce unin­tend­ed con­se­quences that ulti­mate­ly under­mine its stat­ed goals. Militarized crack­downs often frag­ment crim­i­nal orga­ni­za­tions rather than elim­i­nate them, lead­ing to more vio­lence as rival groups com­pete for ter­ri­to­ry. Crop erad­i­ca­tion can dev­as­tate rur­al liveli­hoods with­out pro­vid­ing viable eco­nom­ic alter­na­tives, push­ing farm­ers toward oth­er illic­it activ­i­ties. In some cas­es, secu­ri­ty assis­tance has strength­ened state forces impli­cat­ed in human rights abus­es, cre­at­ing cycles of griev­ance and insta­bil­i­ty that out­last any tem­po­rary reduc­tion in drug supply.
There is also a moral dimen­sion to con­sid­er. When a pow­er­ful nation uses eco­nom­ic lever­age, aid con­di­tion­al­i­ty, and secu­ri­ty part­ner­ships to com­pel oth­er coun­tries to adopt its pre­ferred strate­gies, (See the Leahy Act.) it rais­es ques­tions about sov­er­eign­ty and account­abil­i­ty. The com­mu­ni­ties most affect­ed by erad­i­ca­tion cam­paigns or mil­i­ta­rized polic­ing are often among the poor­est and least polit­i­cal­ly influ­en­tial in their own coun­tries. They bear the brunt of poli­cies designed pri­mar­i­ly to sat­is­fy polit­i­cal imper­a­tives in Washington.
Meanwhile, domes­tic reform efforts with­in the United States have increas­ing­ly acknowl­edged that addic­tion is a pub­lic health issue. Harm reduc­tion strate­gies, expand­ed access to treat­ment, and crim­i­nal jus­tice reforms sig­nal a par­tial shift in think­ing. Yet this evo­lu­tion has not been ful­ly mir­rored in for­eign pol­i­cy. The out­ward-fac­ing pos­ture remains heav­i­ly enforce­ment-ori­ent­ed, even as the inter­nal con­ver­sa­tion grows more nuanced. This incon­sis­ten­cy reveals a deep­er ten­sion: the United States is will­ing to recon­sid­er pun­ish­ment at home, but it con­tin­ues to export puni­tive frame­works abroad.
A defin­i­tive assess­ment must con­front a sim­ple fact: sup­ply fol­lows demand. No lev­el of coer­cion applied to oth­er nations can elim­i­nate the drug trade so long as American con­sumers sus­tain it. Addressing root caus­es requires invest­ment in men­tal health ser­vices, eco­nom­ic oppor­tu­ni­ty, edu­ca­tion, and evi­dence-based treat­ment. It demands con­fronting the social despair and struc­tur­al inequities that make drug use appeal­ing or numb­ing for so many. It also requires humil­i­ty — the recog­ni­tion that domes­tic pol­i­cy fail­ures can­not be cor­rect­ed through exter­nal pres­sure alone.
None of this absolves traf­fick­ing orga­ni­za­tions of respon­si­bil­i­ty, nor does it deny the transna­tion­al nature of crim­i­nal net­works. But it does chal­lenge the premise that the pri­ma­ry bat­tle­field lies beyond U.S. bor­ders. As long as American pol­i­cy defines drugs as an exter­nal inva­sion rather than an inter­nal demand prob­lem, it will con­tin­ue to rely on coer­cive tools that strain inter­na­tion­al rela­tion­ships and inflict col­lat­er­al damage.
Ultimately, the cohe­sion imposed by the United States on oth­er nations in the name of drug con­trol reflects a broad­er pat­tern in its for­eign pol­i­cy: the pro­jec­tion of domes­tic anx­i­eties onto the glob­al stage. The insis­tence that oth­ers solve a prob­lem root­ed in American con­sump­tion is both strate­gi­cal­ly flawed and eth­i­cal­ly fraught. A more hon­est and effec­tive approach would begin at home, acknowl­edg­ing that the endur­ing affin­i­ty for illic­it drugs in the United States can­not be bombed, fumi­gat­ed, or sanc­tioned out of exis­tence abroad. It must be under­stood, treat­ed, and trans­formed within.

Stop Undermining Jamaica’s Front-Line Defenders

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Jamaica’s Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) has drift­ed far from its orig­i­nal man­date of impar­tial over­sight into a pat­tern of reflex­ive sus­pi­cion — pub­licly cast­ing doubt on legit­i­mate police shoot­ings with­out cred­i­ble evi­dence to the con­trary. This pos­ture does real dam­age. It erodes pub­lic trust in law enforce­ment, demor­al­izes offi­cers who dai­ly risk their lives, and embold­ens vio­lent crim­i­nals who thrive when the author­i­ty of the police is questioned.

The facts are plain. In com­mu­ni­ties once ter­ror­ized by orga­nized gun­men, homi­cide has dropped by as much as 60 per­cent fol­low­ing sus­tained police oper­a­tions. These life-sav­ing gains did not come from press con­fer­ences or activist state­ments; they came from boots on the ground — offi­cers con­fronting armed crim­i­nals who chose to chal­lenge the state with lethal force. The pris­ons and jails are filled with peo­ple who sen­si­bly sur­ren­dered to police author­i­ty. Criminal offend­ers who com­mit­ted crimes with­out point­ing guns at law enforce­ment. Violent encoun­ters hap­pen only when crim­i­nals make that choice.

Yet INDECOM per­sists in cre­at­ing an atmos­phere of auto­mat­ic dis­be­lief, treat­ing police tes­ti­mo­ny as sus­pect by default. This plays neat­ly into the agen­da of out­side activist groups such as Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), whose sur­vival depends on sus­tain­ing a nar­ra­tive of per­pet­u­al abuse rather than acknowl­edg­ing the unde­ni­able improve­ments in pub­lic safe­ty. While INDECOM’s work is fund­ed by Jamaican tax­pay­ers, JFJ is sus­tained by opaque streams of for­eign fund­ing — both enti­ties heav­i­ly influ­enc­ing pub­lic dis­course about secu­ri­ty, with lit­tle account­abil­i­ty for the con­se­quences of their rhetoric on already volatile communities.

Oversight is nec­es­sary, but under­min­ing is destruc­tive. Scrutiny must be evi­dence-based, mea­sured, and respon­si­ble — not ide­o­log­i­cal the­ater that weak­ens the rule of law and hands psy­cho­log­i­cal advan­tage to crim­i­nals. Jamaica can­not afford state agen­cies that demor­al­ize its secu­ri­ty forces while cit­i­zens con­tin­ue to live under the shad­ow of violence.
The coun­try must reject the cor­ro­sive habit of state insti­tu­tions and activist out­fits under­min­ing the very men and women tasked with pro­tect­ing us. Jamaica’s police offi­cers deserve fair over­sight — not auto­mat­ic sus­pi­cion — and the pub­lic deserves safe­ty, not man­u­fac­tured con­tro­ver­sy. The stakes are too high for any­thing less. (MB)

Jamaica’s Future At Stake: The 2025 Election Showdown

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Jamaica’s future hangs in the bal­ance as the 2025 elec­tion show­down approach­es, with the stakes high­er than ever. This video exam­ines the crit­i­cal issues shap­ing Jamaica’s polit­i­cal land­scape, focus­ing on the gov­er­nance of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) over two terms and the con­trast­ing posi­tions of the People’s National Party (PNP). From eco­nom­ic progress and infra­struc­ture devel­op­ment to the ongo­ing cri­sis of vio­lent crime and cor­rup­tion scan­dals, we explore the suc­cess­es and fail­ures that will influ­ence vot­ers’ decisions.

The dis­cus­sion delves into the JLP’s efforts in reduc­ing debt, fos­ter­ing eco­nom­ic growth, and devel­op­ing pub­lic ser­vice sys­tems, while address­ing per­sis­tent chal­lenges such as high crime rates and envi­ron­men­tal con­cerns. On the oth­er side, the PNP’s oppo­si­tion to stricter penal­ties for vio­lent crim­i­nals rais­es ques­tions about their approach to nation­al secu­ri­ty and their abil­i­ty to address Jamaica’s press­ing issues. With crime stand­ing as the nation’s great­est threat, can Jamaicans afford to pri­or­i­tize rights over safe­ty? For over a decade, I have addressed these issues, advo­cat­ing for invest­ing in stronger secu­ri­ty mea­sures, break­ing the cycle of crime, and hold­ing lead­ers account­able. As the nation pre­pares for this piv­otal elec­tion, we salute those work­ing tire­less­ly to cre­ate sys­temic solu­tions that ensure safe­ty and sta­bil­i­ty for all Jamaicans.

Extreme Leniency In Bail And Sentencing Of Jamaica’s Worst Murderers:

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Jamaica, like many oth­er coun­tries, strug­gles with high rates of vio­lent crime, par­tic­u­lar­ly mur­der. Despite tough leg­is­la­tion such as the Firearms Act and var­i­ous anti-gang laws, con­cerns per­sist regard­ing the jus­tice system’s treat­ment of dan­ger­ous offend­ers. A trou­bling pat­tern has emerged where some of Jamaica’s most vio­lent crim­i­nals are grant­ed bail with rel­a­tive ease or receive what many per­ceive to be lenient sen­tences. This paper crit­i­cal­ly exam­ines cas­es where extreme lenien­cy has under­mined pub­lic con­fi­dence in the jus­tice sys­tem, endan­gered com­mu­ni­ties, and embold­ened crim­i­nal elements.

1. The Context of Bail and Sentencing in Jamaica

Under Jamaica’s legal frame­work, bail is not auto­mat­i­cal­ly denied for mur­der charges, although it is rare for accused mur­der­ers to be grant­ed bail. However, the dis­cre­tion lies with the judge, based on fac­tors like the strength of the evi­dence, risk of flight, and poten­tial threat to soci­ety. Sentencing, mean­while, is guid­ed by leg­is­la­tion, but judges exer­cise dis­cre­tion with­in statu­to­ry frame­works. Critics argue that, in prac­tice, this dis­cre­tion some­times results in deci­sions that seem out of step with the sever­i­ty of crimes and the demands of pub­lic safety.

2. Case Studies of Lenient Bail Decisions

a. Christopher ‘Dog Paw’ Linton

Linton, reput­ed leader of the Dog Paw Gang, was charged with mul­ti­ple counts of mur­der, shoot­ing with intent, and ille­gal pos­ses­sion of firearms. Despite fac­ing seri­ous alle­ga­tions tied to vio­lent crimes, Linton was grant­ed bail in 2010. After being released, he was impli­cat­ed in addi­tion­al vio­lent activ­i­ties, includ­ing orches­trat­ing shoot­ings. His case high­light­ed gaps in the bail sys­tem, where the grav­i­ty of offens­es and threats to pub­lic safe­ty were seem­ing­ly downplayed.

b. Tesha Miller

As the reput­ed leader of the Spanish Town-based Clansman Gang, Tesha Miller was impli­cat­ed in numer­ous vio­lent crimes, includ­ing the orches­trat­ed killing of Jamaica Urban Transit Company chair­man Douglas Chambers. Despite his crim­i­nal pro­file and being deport­ed twice from the U.S., Miller was grant­ed bail on mul­ti­ple occa­sions while fac­ing seri­ous charges. Critics argue that his bail releas­es facil­i­tat­ed his con­tin­ued influ­ence over gang oper­a­tions and vio­lence in Spanish Town.

c. Eldon Calvert

Calvert, for­mer head of the feared Montego Bay-based Stone Crusher Gang, was charged with sev­er­al counts of mur­der and oth­er vio­lent crimes. Despite over­whelm­ing alle­ga­tions of bru­tal­i­ty, he was grant­ed bail mul­ti­ple times between 2008 and 2014. He was even­tu­al­ly acquit­ted in sev­er­al cas­es due to lack of evi­dence, with many wit­ness­es refus­ing to tes­ti­fy out of fear. His tem­po­rary free­doms, how­ev­er, were wide­ly crit­i­cized as emblem­at­ic of a jus­tice sys­tem inca­pable of con­tain­ing known threats.

3. Lenient Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers

a. Patrick Green

Patrick Green was con­vict­ed in 2018 of killing his com­mon-law wife. Despite the grue­some nature of the crime, he was sen­tenced to just eight years in prison. With good behav­ior and time already served, he stood to be released in under five years. Many argued that the sen­tence failed to reflect the seri­ous­ness of the crime and the broad­er issue of domes­tic vio­lence-relat­ed mur­ders in Jamaica.

b. Rushane Barnett

In 2022, Barnett com­mit­ted one of the most hor­rif­ic crimes in recent mem­o­ry, mur­der­ing his cousin and her four chil­dren in Clarendon. He plead­ed guilty and was sen­tenced to life impris­on­ment with eli­gi­bil­i­ty for parole after 61 years. While the sen­tence was severe, some argued that this case war­rant­ed the death penal­ty, which is still on Jamaica’s law books, but has not been enforced for decades.

c. Adidja ‘Vybz Kartel’ Palmer

Convicted in 2014 for orches­trat­ing the mur­der of Clive ‘Lizard’ Williams, Vybz Kartel was sen­tenced to life in prison with eli­gi­bil­i­ty for parole after 35 years. However, fol­low­ing an appeal in 2020, his parole eli­gi­bil­i­ty was reduced to 32 years and six months. Despite being behind bars, alle­ga­tions per­sist that Kartel con­tin­ues to direct crim­i­nal activ­i­ties. His case rais­es con­cerns about sen­tenc­ing, prison man­age­ment, and the influ­ence of high-pro­file criminals.

4. Factors Contributing to Leniency

Several sys­temic issues con­tribute to these lenient outcomes:
• Judicial Discretion: Judges must inter­pret the law and bal­ance defen­dants’ rights with pub­lic safe­ty, often under chal­leng­ing circumstances.
• Witness Intimidation: Witnesses fre­quent­ly refuse to tes­ti­fy due to fear of reprisals, lead­ing to weak­ened cas­es and reduced sentences.
• Overburdened Courts: Backlogs and admin­is­tra­tive chal­lenges pres­sure judges to expe­dite cas­es, some­times result­ing in plea deals or low­er sentences.
• Legislative Gaps: Certain laws lack manda­to­ry min­i­mums or clear sen­tenc­ing guide­lines, leav­ing too much room for discretion.

5. Implications for Justice and Public Safety

Extreme lenien­cy in bail and sen­tenc­ing has sev­er­al dam­ag­ing effects:
• Erosion of Public Trust: Communities lose faith in the legal sys­tem, per­ceiv­ing it as inef­fec­tive or biased.
• Escalation of Violence: Freed crim­i­nals often resume vio­lent activ­i­ties, lead­ing to more mur­ders and com­mu­ni­ty instability.
• Deterrence Undermined: Light penal­ties fail to send a strong mes­sage that mur­der and vio­lent crimes will be met with harsh consequences.

6. Calls for Reform

There have been repeat­ed calls from cit­i­zens, advo­ca­cy groups, and polit­i­cal lead­ers for:
• Stricter Bail Laws: Especially for accused mur­der­ers and gang leaders.
• Mandatory Minimum Sentences: To remove exces­sive dis­cre­tion from the judiciary.
• Witness Protection Enhancements: To ensure wit­ness­es can safe­ly testify.
• Restoration of the Death Penalty: Some argue that cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment should be active­ly enforced to deter the worst offenders.

Conclusion

Jamaica’s bat­tle against vio­lent crime is under­mined when its jus­tice sys­tem appears lenient toward the very indi­vid­u­als who wreak hav­oc on soci­ety. Cases of extreme lenien­cy in bail deci­sions and sen­tenc­ing send trou­bling sig­nals to both crim­i­nals and vic­tims alike. Comprehensive reforms are urgent­ly need­ed to restore con­fi­dence in the jus­tice sys­tem and ensure that jus­tice is not only done but seen to be done.

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Jamaican Behavior Differences In US Vs Jamaica

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In this addi­tion­al deep dive. I want to talk about Jamaicans who trav­el to the United States, whether as American cit­i­zens, per­ma­nent res­i­dents or vis­i­tors. They often dis­play a remark­able lev­el of dis­ci­plin at Airports. For the most part they fol­low instruc­tions, care­ful­ly, avoid con­fronta­tion, and even when spo­ken to harsh­ly by cus­tom offi­cers, law enforce­ment offi­cers, or just reg­u­lar air­port staff. They main­tain com­po­sure and com­ply with­out resis­tance. This behav­ior is not coin­ci­den­tal, it stems from an aware­ness that the Us. Legal sys­tem is strict, unfor­giv­ing, and swift in its con­se­quences. The fear of depor­ta­tion, fines, impris­on­ment, or oth­er legal reper­cus­sions com­pels them to adopt an atti­tude of respect even in sit­u­a­tions where they may feel mistreated.

However, a stark con­trast emerg­ing when these same indi­vid­u­als returned to Jamaicin their home­land. Many of these same Jamaicans exhib­it a dras­ti­cal­ly dif­fer­ent demeanor. They show zero respect to their own law enforce­ment offi­cers in their home­land, and many active­ly con­tribute to the law­less­ness that plagues the coun­try from smug­gling firearms into the island to fund­ing and orga­niz­ing crim­i­nal net­works. Their actions fuel the very vio­lence that has crip­pled com­mu­ni­ties across the coun­try. Not all the indi­vid­u­als deport­ed are crim­i­nals, but many are. And so when these indi­vid­u­als who are often referred to as depor­tees or for­eign links break American laws and are deport­ed. A large major­i­ty of them sim­ply con­tin­ue with a life of vio­lent crime when they are returned to Jamaica.
The guns they send back sup­ply gangs, esca­late con­flicts and serves to expo­nen­tial­ly increase the mur­der rate on the Island.
This is why it is imper­a­tive that the American Government help Jamaica to track down those Jamaicans who trav­el to the United States to pur­chase guns then send the weapons home, then leave and go back to Jamaica to cash in on this illic­it trade.

Foreign Money Funding Anti-police Groups

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Illegal guns are flood­ing Jamaica, cre­at­ing a dire nation­al secu­ri­ty cri­sis. This video exam­ines who’s to blame and delves into the sys­temic chal­lenges that have plagued the coun­try for decades. Every fac­tor is scru­ti­nized from the alarm­ing ship­ments of firearms to the crit­i­cal role of law enforce­ment and for­eign-fund­ed orga­ni­za­tions like Jamaicans for Justice. This issue, addressed for over a decade, high­lights the strug­gle of the secu­ri­ty forces work­ing with lim­it­ed resources to com­bat esca­lat­ing violence.

In 2024, Jamaica had 1,141 mur­ders, accord­ing to Statista. This is a decrease from 2023 when there were 1,393 mur­ders. 
Most of the lives lost were attrib­uted to ille­gal firearms. This empha­sizes the need for sys­temic reform. This dis­cus­sion cri­tiques the influ­ence of exter­nal fund­ing from enti­ties like the Open Society Foundation, rais­ing ques­tions about their impact on Jamaica’s poli­cies and sov­er­eign­ty. The video explores the bal­ance between human rights advo­ca­cy and law enforce­ment pro­tec­tion, invest­ing in solu­tions that break the cycle of vio­lence and cor­rup­tion. We salute the brave police offi­cers and cit­i­zens who stand firm against these threats, refus­ing to let Jamaica slide into chaos.

Evidence Suggest US Not Doing Enough To Stem Flow Of Guns Into Jamaica

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The recent inter­cep­tion of 66 firearms, includ­ing 16 high-pow­ered rifles, and 4,700 rounds of 9mm ammu­ni­tion by Jamaican author­i­ties under­scores a crit­i­cal and per­sis­tent threat to Jamaica’s nation­al secu­ri­ty. This inci­dent is not iso­lat­ed; sim­i­lar seizures have occurred, such as the con­fis­ca­tion of 64 guns and 965 rounds of ammu­ni­tion at Kingston Wharf in February 2024 , and the dis­cov­ery of 52 firearms and near­ly 3,000 rounds of ammu­ni­tion in December 2024 .
The recur­ring nature of these events rais­es press­ing ques­tions about the effi­ca­cy and com­mit­ment of U.S. agen­cies like the TSA, FBI, and oth­ers in stem­ming the flow of ille­gal firearms into Jamaica. The ease with which these weapons tra­verse bor­ders sug­gests sig­nif­i­cant laps­es in detec­tion and enforce­ment mech­a­nisms. Given the sophis­ti­cat­ed track­ing tech­nolo­gies and intel­li­gence capa­bil­i­ties at the dis­pos­al of American agen­cies, it is per­plex­ing and unac­cept­able that the sources and ship­pers of these dead­ly con­sign­ments remain large­ly unapprehended.

The lack of robust coör­di­na­tion and infor­ma­tion shar­ing between U.S. law enforce­ment and the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) exac­er­bates this cri­sis. While Jamaican author­i­ties have demon­strat­ed vig­i­lance and resilience in inter­cept­ing these ship­ments, their efforts are under­mined by insuf­fi­cient sup­port from their American coun­ter­parts. This dis­con­nect not only endan­gers Jamaican lives but also fuels insta­bil­i­ty that can have far-reach­ing impli­ca­tions beyond the island’s shores.
It is imper­a­tive that the United States acknowl­edges its role in this ongo­ing issue and takes deci­sive action. This includes imple­ment­ing strin­gent export con­trols, enhanc­ing sur­veil­lance of out­bound ship­ments, and pros­e­cut­ing indi­vid­u­als and net­works respon­si­ble for arms traf­fick­ing. Moreover, estab­lish­ing a for­mal and effec­tive part­ner­ship with Jamaican law enforce­ment is essen­tial to dis­man­tle the pipelines that facil­i­tate the ille­gal flow of firearms.
The time for com­pla­cen­cy has long passed. The United States must demon­strate a gen­uine com­mit­ment to curb­ing the export of ille­gal firearms and col­lab­o­rate earnest­ly with Jamaican author­i­ties to pro­tect lives and uphold justice.

Shining The Light On INDECOM

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This arti­cle was writ­ten and pub­lished on June 6th 2019, five years lat­er Hamish Campbell is still at INDECOM seem­ing­ly with a renewed sense of assertive­ness anchored in the false belief that Jamaicans are either too stu­pid or too enam­ored with his white skin to care about his past. This writer has no such hand­i­cap, as a con­se­quence I am on a mis­sion to out the liars who stand in judge­ment over those who make the sac­ri­fices to keep every­one safe. 

I have always won­dered what exact­ly it was that impressed Jamaican author­i­ties about Mark Shields, Les Green and the oth­er British Cops who emi­grat­ed to Jamaica, sup­pos­ed­ly to help trans­form the Jamaica Constabulary Force into a mod­ern police force, or so they say. The truth of the mat­ter is that from what we have heard, Mark Shields got him­self a Jamaican bride, secured him­self a secu­ri­ty com­pa­ny in our coun­try, or so we are told.  Never mind that even if they do not stay, they end up spend­ing sig­nif­i­cant amounts of time before leaving.  And what is it about these white men going out to the Colonies being referred to as [Expatriates] while Black peo­ple head­ing to England are mere [immi­grants]? So you nev­er thought about that? Okay, then it’s just me.  None of those [immi­grant cops]have fas­ci­nat­ed me more than Hamish Campbell who arrived as over­seer and sec­ond in charge of INDECOM. And I will talk a lit­tle about Hamish Campbell a lit­tle lat­er but I want­ed to just high­light some things which Les Green said about the local cops he was forced to encounter out there in the colony. We all know how the Colonial mas­ters view the lazy sub-human peas­antry. But I rather pre­fer to let Les Green speak for Les Green and you can decide if he even both­ered to hide the old tropes and big­ot­ed attack lines which they have always used when they speak of black people. Never mind that at the time the unin­tel­li­gent Jamaican media gob­bled it up and saw noth­ing unsa­vory or dis­gust­ing­ly offen­sive in those tropes. Instead, they used the oppor­tu­ni­ty to pile on the police, their black coun­try­men and women.

Said Green: “When I first went there, the foren­sic capa­bil­i­ty was very poor and inef­fec­tive. There it still takes up to two years to get DNA results, unlike in the UK where you can get them in two days.“He added: “In Jamaica, there is noth­ing like the sense of urgency I had in the UK where I would send some­one out to take a state­ment and they would do it imme­di­ate­ly. There, I could send some­one out for weeks on end and even­tu­al­ly they would come back with a state­ment. “If a pret­ty girl walks past, they will look at the pret­ty girl instead of what they are doing. There is always tomor­row, always anoth­er time to do some­thing. There’s always a drink or a pret­ty woman to dis­tract them.” Green, is cred­it­ed with bring­ing about sig­nif­i­cant improve­ments to Jamaica’s crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly homi­cides, described his eight-year tenure as frus­trat­ing because of the lev­el of vio­lence and weak sys­tems of inves­ti­ga­tion. (Gleaner)

I do share Les Green’s frus­tra­tion with the colonists after all, why would­n’t he be annoyed at the time? They shook us from the Queen’s broke and des­ti­tute frock-tails over 57 years ago. Battered and in sham­bles after the blitzkrieg of Hitler’s Luftwaffe, England want­ed some­one to give her hand­outs, instead of being respon­si­ble for anyone.  Since then, we haven’t man­aged to stand on our own, we still insist on call­ing her “our sov­er­eign lady”, even though I can­not imag­ine why? We refuse to write a con­sti­tu­tion which demon­strates that we can gov­ern our­selves with­out depend­ing on the British to medi­ate our dis­putes, and deter­mine our most seri­ous crim­i­nal cases.  What we have demon­strat­ed, is that when the rub­ber meets the road we can­not trust our­selves to decide on our own with­out “Massa”, decid­ing for us. Green’s broad­side was the typ­i­cal racist trope of the lazy, over­sexed blacks who have no intel­li­gence or sense of urgency. Unfortunately for the politi­cians and media, couched in his insults was the lan­guage which spoke to their inad­e­qua­cies as well but it com­plete­ly went over their heads and they curt­sied, bowed and agreed with “Massa”.

I had one slight con­cern about Les Green’s com­ments at the time and still to this day I still have those con­cerns. You know out­side the Overseer/​Natives thing he had going on there. When Les Green said the fol­low­ing, did he think that because we are back­ward natives,[sic] we did not know what goes on in drea­ry bleak Old England?  “In Jamaica, there is noth­ing like the sense of urgency I had in the UK where I would send some­one out to take a state­ment and they would do it imme­di­ate­ly. There, I could send some­one out for weeks on end and even­tu­al­ly they would come back with a state­ment. “If a pret­ty girl walks past, they will look at the pret­ty girl instead of what they are doing. There is always tomor­row, always anoth­er time to do some­thing. There’s always a drink or a pret­ty woman to dis­tract them.” Wait just a minute there, accord­ing to… (https://whathappenedtomadeleinemccann.blogspot.com/2014/04/a‑biography-of-hamish-campbell-man_28.html Hamish Campbell the [British Immigrant] inves­ti­gat­ing our police offi­cers was actu­al­ly the lead offi­cer in a mur­der case in which evi­dence was alleged­ly plant­ed in order to gain convictions.

Hamish Campbell — was the (IO) Investigating Officer- placed in charge of the day-to-day inves­ti­ga­tion into Jill Dando’s mur­der in 1999. He was pri­mar­i­ly respon­si­ble for the arrest and charg­ing of Barry Bulsara, known also as ‘Barry George’, with the mur­der of Dando. Bulsara was sen­tenced to life impris­on­ment for mur­der­ing Jill Dando but sub­se­quent­ly acquit­ted, sev­en years lat­er, on appeal.  Prior to the appoint­ment of Moore and Campbell to run the case, the inves­ti­ga­tion had found noth­ing of inter­est, despite over 7 months on the case. The Met had thou­sands of reg­is­tered infor­mants. Not one of them had come up with any infor­ma­tion at all about who might have killed Jill Dando and why. A reward of £250,000 for infor­ma­tion (about £½ mil­lion today) had pro­duced noth­ing. Operation Oxborough had inter­viewed in depth Dando’s fam­i­ly, friends, lovers (of whom there had been many) and col­leagues. As Gillard and Flynn cor­rect­ly observed in their book (p. 428), “The mur­der inves­ti­ga­tion was at an impasse”. Then Campbell took over. The only foren­sic evi­dence against Bulsara was a speck of firearms residue said to have been ‘found’ in his coat pock­et. Hamish Campbell appeared on Crimewatch to rein­force in the public’s mind that it was an obses­sive lon­er they were look­ing for. He asked for the public’s help in iden­ti­fy­ing such a person.  It was a full 15 days after the Cecil Gee coat was seized that it was tak­en to a Mr Robin Keeley of the Forensic Science Service on 2 May 2000. That 15-day delay has nev­er been explained. He then found a sin­gle speck of firearm residue inside the left pock­et, and said that it was con­sis­tent with the type of firearm used to kill Dando.  D. Cliff Richard, a friend of Jill Dando, was inter­viewed ‘a num­ber of times’ by the police inves­ti­gat­ing Dando’s killing. Barry Bulsara spent 7 years in prison before he was released after win­ning his sec­ond appeal.

The pat­tern was evi­dent in an ear­li­er case this time it was the case of Ira Thomas a black man, who was quote [fit­ted up with a mur­der charge]  The Appeal Court heard the appeal on 13 February 1992 and quashed the jury’s major­i­ty deci­sion. Thomas was imme­di­ate­ly released from prison. See The fab­ri­ca­tion of evi­dence against Ira Thomas/​at the link pro­vid­ed above.

But there is more, it is impor­tant to bring some of these facts to light after the for­mer Immigrant Les Green attempt­ed to slime the natives in the for­mer Colony. According to the report­ing, there was a sig­nif­i­cant amount of at least low-lev­el cor­rup­tion at Begravia Police Station at the time. Belgravia Police Station is close to Harrods, owned by Al-Fayed. Al-Fayed did favors for Begravia-based police offi­cers. Police offi­cers returned the favors. Indeed, there was already an anti-cor­rup­tion inves­ti­ga­tion at that time into the so-called ‘Hamper Squad’, a group of Belgravia-based offi­cers who would arrest and harass any­one, includ­ing his own employ­ees, sus­pect­ed of aid­ing and abet­ting his bit­ter busi­ness ene­my, Lonrho tycoon ‘Tiny’ Rowland. The greedy offi­cers had a con­tin­u­ous sup­ply of free ham­pers and huge dis­counts on Harrods goods. Indeed, one hon­est offi­cer, Bob Loftus, gave the anti-cor­rup­tion unit the actu­al names of police offi­cers who had accept­ed these bribes. No police offi­cer, how­ev­er, was ever pros­e­cut­ed for these crim­i­nal offenses. At the time, Al-Fayed owned the now-defunct satir­i­cal mag­a­zine, Punch. Officers also leaked details of the Dando inves­ti­ga­tion to Punch, prompt­ing a leak inquiry.  .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… I won­der how Les Green could have missed these acts of cor­rup­tion? Even more sig­nif­i­cant, how could Hamish Campbell not be aware of these crimes being com­mit­ted by his col­leagues at the Begravia station?

But Hamish Campbell, whose career has more ques­tion marks than answers, is in Jamaica as we speak. His job as Assistant Commissioner of INDECOM is to weed out dirty cops from the JCF Now, remem­ber that as the Investigating offi­cer, Hamish Campbell’s inves­ti­ga­tions sud­den­ly turned up a speck of firear­m’s residue said to have been ‘found’ in a coat pock­et that oth­er offi­cers had already searched thor­ough­ly in a case which was seven(7) months old when he took over the Investigations. Either Hamish Campbell is a supe­ri­or super sleuth or Hamish Campbell has skele­tons in his clos­et we need to unearth. If the Jill Dando inves­ti­ga­tions are any­thing to go by, the arrest and con­vic­tion of an inno­cent man and his sub­se­quent exon­er­a­tion, then the lat­ter inter­pre­ta­tions about Hamish Campbell is more on point. Barry Bulsara was alleged­ly [fit­ted up], British lex­i­con, for fram­ing an accused, in a case in which Hamish Campbell was the chief inves­ti­gat­ing offi­cer. Barry Bulsara was acquit­ted after spend­ing 7 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. What part if any, did Hamish Campbell play in fit­ting up Barry Bulsara?

Hamish Campbell is now a Deputy Commissioner of INDECOM, one of the many agen­cies tasked with over­sight of Jamaica’s Security Forces. I fun­da­men­tal­ly believe Terrence Williams is a pseu­do [tit­u­lar] head of INDECOM. I believe that he is at the helm of INDECOM because it would seem too much of an, in your face insult to the nation to bring in an immi­grant(Hamish Campbell), and make him head of a gov­ern­ment agency. Terrence Williams polit­i­cal affil­i­a­tions and his bel­li­cose anti-police per­sona, makes him the ide­al can­di­date to be a tit­u­lar head. Nevertheless, we have seen noth­ing in the Career path of Hamish Campbell which would cause the Jamaican Government to bring him in and make him an inves­ti­ga­tor and deci­sion mak­er over our police sol­diers and cor­rec­tions officers.

The recent deci­sion of a sev­en-per­son jury in the supreme court last week to free two police offi­cers inves­ti­gat­ed and charged By Terrence Williams and Hamish Campbell seems in line with Hamish Campbell’s history. Which is to man­u­fac­ture evi­dence, coerce wit­ness­es to lie and to con­coct false evi­dence on which to [fit-up] inno­cent peo­ple for crimes they have not committed.  Quite inter­est­ing­ly INDECOM seems to now have a fas­ci­na­tion with firearm residue and have gone to great lengths to bring in for­eign so-called experts. While the police defen­dants and their legal teams have no pow­er or resources to vet their resumes.  With close to 2’000 homi­cides each year in Jamaica the Jamaican Government brings in zero for­eign experts to con­vict the murderers. INDECOM brings in for­eign experts to tes­ti­fy in an effort to try and con­vict our hard work­ing poor­ly com­pen­sat­ed police officers. Long before the so-called [death squad] case was even brought, we received numer­ous reports that INDECOM was induc­ing and coerc­ing alleged wit­ness­es to lie in order to con­vict the officers. Clearly, a jury saw through the lies and those sev­en Jamaicans sent a pow­er­ful mes­sage for jus­tice and the rule of law. Unfortunately for Jamaica, Terrence Williams and Hamish Campbell are still in their jobs. Neither of these hacks has been sched­uled to answer for what occurred with the evi­dence in this case. This Administration and the one it suc­ceed­ed has insist­ed that INDECOM is answer­able to a select com­mit­tee of the Parliament.  We have seen no evi­dence that either Terrence Williams or Hamish Campbell will be hauled before that com­mit­tee to explain the alle­ga­tions which have swirled around this par­tic­u­lar inves­ti­ga­tion from day one. The jury has done its job, but don’t hold your breath for the politi­cians to do theirs.

Government Serious About Deportees But Is It Capable Of Dealing With What They May Bring?

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Solving Jamaica’s Crime Epidemic

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Solving Jamaica’s Crime Epidemic

Jamaica’s crime epi­dem­ic, par­tic­u­lar­ly vio­lent crimes such as homi­cides, pos­es a sig­nif­i­cant chal­lenge to nation­al devel­op­ment. The coun­try con­sis­tent­ly ranks among those with the high­est mur­der rates glob­al­ly, fueled by gang vio­lence, eco­nom­ic inequal­i­ty, cor­rup­tion, and a strug­gling jus­tice system.
A Justice sys­tem in which Judges ignore the laws and sup­plant them with their own lib­er­al bias­es that are sym­pa­thet­ic to mass mur­der­ers. A sys­tem in which tax-pay­er fund­ed pub­lic ser­vants who are sup­posed to look at impro­pri­ety with­in pub­lic sec­tor agen­cies fail at their jobs but band togeth­er with anti-police agi­ta­tors to cre­ate the impres­sion that mur­der­ers who shoot at police are being sum­mar­i­ly executed.
A sys­tem in which politi­cians of both polit­i­cal par­ties are too heav­i­ly invest­ed in the crime econ­o­my to pass ade­quate laws geared at stem­ming violence.
A crim­i­nal Justice sys­tem that caters to the con­cerns of crim­i­nals and ignores their vic­tims. A sys­tem in which we plat­form sup­port­ers of gang­sters and ‘Dons’, but have no con­cern for the peo­ple they abuse includ­ing lit­tle girls they rape and the boys they ini­ti­ate into their gangs.
While this cri­sis is com­plex, it is not insur­mount­able. A com­pre­hen­sive solu­tion must involve a com­bi­na­tion of social inter­ven­tion, police sup­port, eco­nom­ic oppor­tu­ni­ty, and com­mu­ni­ty engagement.

Social Intervention and Education

One of the most effec­tive long-term solu­tions to crime is invest­ing in edu­ca­tion and youth pro­grams. Many young Jamaicans turn to gangs due to a lack of oppor­tu­ni­ty and a sense of belong­ing. By expand­ing access to qual­i­ty edu­ca­tion, voca­tion­al train­ing, and men­tor­ship pro­grams, the gov­ern­ment can pro­vide alter­na­tive path­ways for at-risk youth. Initiatives such as the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) have shown promise, but more invest­ment is need­ed to scale these efforts.
Additionally, social ser­vices must be strength­ened to sup­port fam­i­lies in vul­ner­a­ble com­mu­ni­ties. Many young men involved in crime come from unsta­ble homes, where pover­ty and abuse are preva­lent. Expanding men­tal health sup­port, par­ent­ing pro­grams, and ear­ly child­hood inter­ven­tions can help break the cycle of vio­lence before it begins.

Police and Judicial Reform

Jamaica’s police force has long strug­gled with issues of cor­rup­tion, inef­fi­cien­cy, and a lack of pub­lic trust. To effec­tive­ly com­bat crime, law enforce­ment must under­go sig­nif­i­cant reform. This includes improv­ing police train­ing, increas­ing account­abil­i­ty for mis­con­duct, and fos­ter­ing bet­ter rela­tion­ships between offi­cers and com­mu­ni­ties. Programs like com­mu­ni­ty polic­ing, where offi­cers work close­ly with res­i­dents to pre­vent crime rather than just react to it, should be expanded.
The judi­cial sys­tem must also be strength­ened to ensure swift and fair jus­tice. Many crimes go unpun­ished due to back­logged courts a lack of resources and peo­ple on the bench who sim­ply do not belong there.
Expanding foren­sic capa­bil­i­ties, increas­ing the num­ber of judges, and imple­ment­ing tech­nol­o­gy-dri­ven case man­age­ment can help cre­ate a more effi­cient legal system.

Economic Growth and Job Creation

Crime thrives where eco­nom­ic despair exists. Many young peo­ple engage in ille­gal activ­i­ties sim­ply to sur­vive. Addressing the root cause of crime requires cre­at­ing legit­i­mate eco­nom­ic oppor­tu­ni­ties, par­tic­u­lar­ly in inner-city com­mu­ni­ties. This can be achieved through invest­ments in small busi­ness­es, entre­pre­neur­ship pro­grams, and indus­tries that pro­vide sta­ble employ­ment, such as agri­cul­ture, tech­nol­o­gy, and tourism.
Additionally, the gov­ern­ment should pro­vide tax incen­tives and grants for com­pa­nies that hire from high-crime areas. Public-pri­vate part­ner­ships can play a cru­cial role in cre­at­ing sus­tain­able jobs and reduc­ing depen­dence on illic­it economies.
Jamaica has many pris­tine beach­es and forests that belong to the peo­ple. It is time for the Government to devel­op beach­es and oth­er nat­ur­al won­ders in our coun­try into nation­al parks which will employ young peo­ple and increase the tourism product.

Community Involvement and Cultural Change

Solving Jamaica’s crime epi­dem­ic is not just the respon­si­bil­i­ty of the gov­ern­ment — it requires a nation­al effort. Community orga­ni­za­tions, church­es, and local lead­ers must work togeth­er to instill pos­i­tive val­ues and medi­ate con­flicts before they esca­late into vio­lence. Encouraging civic engage­ment, pro­mot­ing con­flict res­o­lu­tion train­ing, and reviv­ing com­mu­ni­ty cen­ters can help rebuild trust and reduce crime.
More impor­tant­ly the idea of men hav­ing chil­dren they can­not afford to sup­port must be dis­cour­aged and penalized.
Furthermore, there must be a shift in cul­tur­al atti­tudes towards vio­lence. Music, media, and social influ­encers play a pow­er­ful role in shap­ing soci­etal norms. Promoting mes­sages of peace, respect, and per­son­al respon­si­bil­i­ty can help chal­lenge the glo­ri­fi­ca­tion of crime and cre­ate a cul­ture of lawfulness.

Conclusion

Jamaica’s crime epi­dem­ic is a deeply root­ed issue that requires a mul­ti-pronged approach. Social inter­ven­tion, police and judi­cial reform, eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment, and com­mu­ni­ty engage­ment must all work togeth­er to cre­ate last­ing change. While progress will not hap­pen overnight, a com­mit­ted effort from all sec­tors of soci­ety can lead Jamaica towards a safer, more pros­per­ous future. The key to suc­cess lies in address­ing both the symp­toms and the root caus­es of crime, ensur­ing that young Jamaicans have hope, oppor­tu­ni­ty, and a rea­son to choose peace over violence.(MB)