Fareed Zakaria Debunked Shumer’s Arguments For Opposing The Iran Deal Point By Point…

Fareed Zakaria
Fareed Zakaria

By Fareed Zakaria
Thursday, August 13, 2015

Dear Sen. Schumer,

When you announced your deci­sion to vote against the nuclear agree­ment with Iran, you explained your rea­sons in a near­ly 1,700-word state­ment that is thought­ful in sub­stance and civ­il in tone. And yet, in the end, I found it unconvincing.

I believe that the agree­ment is flawed. But it is the most intru­sive, demand­ing and com­pre­hen­sive set of inspec­tions, ver­i­fi­ca­tion pro­to­cols and snap­back mea­sures ever nego­ti­at­ed. Compare the detailed 159-page doc­u­ment with the United States’ 1994 accord with North Korea, which was a vague­ly word­ed four-page doc­u­ment with few mon­i­tor­ing and enforce­ment provisions.

You have three sets of objec­tions, which I will get to, but you fail to note what must hap­pen at the out­set, before Iran gets wide­spread sanc­tions relief.

Iran must destroy 98 per­cent of its enriched ura­ni­um and all of its 5 per­cent to 20 per­cent enriched ura­ni­um, remove and store more than two-thirds of its cen­trifuges (includ­ing all advanced cen­trifuges), ter­mi­nate all enrich­ment at its Fordow nuclear facil­i­ty and ren­der inop­er­a­ble the key com­po­nents of its Arak (plu­to­ni­um) reac­tor. All of these steps must be com­plet­ed to the sat­is­fac­tion of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is dif­fi­cult to imag­ine that a seri­ous mil­i­tary cam­paign against Iran would set back its nuclear pro­gram as much as this deal does from the start. Fordow, for exam­ple, is buried deep in a moun­tain and would prob­a­bly sur­vive all but the most intense bombardment.

Your first objec­tions are about the inspec­tions and sanc­tions. You argue that the inspec­tions are not “any­where, any­time” and have a 24-day delay that is “trou­bling.” But all of Iran’s known nuclear facil­i­ties are sub­ject to any­where, any­time mon­i­tor­ing. And for new, sus­pi­cious sites, as nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis points out, “what oppo­nents of the deal have done is add up all the time lim­its and claim that inspec­tions will occur only after a 24-day pause. This is sim­ply not true. Should the U.S. intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty catch the Iranians red-hand­ed, it might be that the Iranians would drag things out as long as pos­si­ble. But in such a case, the game would be over.”

In that sce­nario Sen. Schumer, you argue that the sanc­tions snap­back pro­vi­sions are cum­ber­some. We must have read dif­fer­ent doc­u­ments. The one I’m look­ing at con­tains the first mech­a­nism for the auto­mat­ic reim­po­si­tion of sanc­tions ever cre­at­ed, to my knowl­edge. And they can be trig­gered by Washington uni­lat­er­al­ly. Peter Feaver, a for­mer aide to President George W. Bush, and sanc­tions expert Eric Lorber, in express­ing skep­ti­cism about the deal, admit that “we are hard-pressed to come up with oth­er exam­ples when the U.N. Security Council has vot­ed to dis­en­fran­chise future U.N. Security Councils and cre­ate legal­ly bind­ing deci­sions on the say-so of a sin­gle member.”

You argue that the United States might pre­fer to restore sanc­tions in part and that oth­er coun­tries might not go along with this. But the fact that Washington could uni­lat­er­al­ly snap back all U.N. sanc­tions is sure­ly extra­or­di­nary lever­age that it could use to get oth­er coun­tries to agree to a par­tial reim­po­si­tion of sanctions.

You fur­ther say that “after 15 years of relief from sanc­tions, Iran would be stronger finan­cial­ly and bet­ter able to advance a robust nuclear pro­gram.” Let’s be clear. Iran is going to get sanc­tions relief no mat­ter what. The inter­na­tion­al sanc­tions against Iran were put in place by oth­er coun­tries sole­ly to get to a nuclear deal. None would go along with extend­ing the sanc­tions, giv­en that Iran has pro­duced what they all regard as an accept­able agreement.

Foreign Policy mag­a­zine report­ed on an extra­or­di­nary meet­ing this month, when top diplo­mats from the oth­er five great pow­ers involved in the deal met with sen­a­tors to urge them to sup­port it. The British and Russian envoys explained that if the deal was reject­ed, the sanc­tions would “unrav­el.”

Your final objec­tion is that Iran would use some of its new­ly freed-up resources “to redou­ble its efforts to cre­ate even more trou­ble in the Middle East.” That might be true, but the deal does not stop the United States and its allies from coun­ter­ing these activ­i­ties, as they do today. The non-nuclear ten­sions between Iran and the United States pre­date Tehran’s nuclear pro­gram, con­tin­ue today and will per­sist in the future. But they would be much worse if Iran had a nuclear thresh­old capacity.

Your basic con­clu­sion is that “if one thinks Iran will mod­er­ate . . . one should approve the agree­ment. . . . But if one feels that Iranian lead­ers will not mod­er­ate . . . then one should con­clude that it would be bet­ter not to approve this agree­ment.” This is the most puz­zling and, frankly, illog­i­cal part of your case. If Iran remains a rogue state, all the more rea­son to put its nuclear pro­gram on a leash.

Rejecting this deal would pro­duce an Iran that ramps up its nuclear pro­gram, with­out inspec­tions or con­straints, with sanc­tions unrav­el­ing and a United States that is humil­i­at­ed and iso­lat­ed in the world. You can­not want this. I respect­ful­ly urge you to recon­sid­er your position.

© 2015, Washington Post Writers Group