Deconstructing Senator Chuck Schumer’s Pro-War Statement About The Iran Nuclear Deal By Muhammad Sahimi, August 12, 2015

Senator Chuck Schumer (D‑NY) has announced that he will oppose the nuclear agree­ment between Iran and P5+1 – the five per­ma­nent mem­bers of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. He has released a detailed state­ment, explain­ing his rea­sons for oppos­ing the agree­ment. Given Schumer’s influ­ence in the U.S. Senate, par­tic­u­lar­ly among the Democrats, it is impor­tant to scru­ti­nize his state­ment and rea­sons. Unfortunately, they are replete with inac­cu­ra­cies, mis­un­der­stand­ing of the rel­e­vant inter­na­tion­al laws, and even total­ly false state­ments. This is unfor­tu­nate for some­one of his stature, par­tic­u­lar­ly a Senator who vot­ed in October 2002 to autho­rize the inva­sion of Iraq by the George W. Bush admin­is­tra­tion, which has con­tributed might­i­ly to the present car­nage in the entire Middle East.

Before ana­lyz­ing Schumer’s state­ment, it is impor­tant to rec­og­nize that the nuclear agree­ment is not a treaty, as it cre­ates no new legal oblig­a­tions for any of the two sides. It only sets the con­di­tions under which the sanc­tions imposed on Iran will be sus­pend­ed, and the legal oblig­a­tions will expire in due time. Accordingly, the agree­ment should not be reviewed by Congress as if it were a new­ly-signed inter­na­tion­al treaty to agree on mutu­al oblig­a­tions. Rather, because the sanc­tions are per­mis­si­ble only as long as the deed that caused them to con­tin­ue, the sole inquiry for Congress is whether Iran’s cur­rent nuclear pro­gram con­tin­ues fol­low­ing the con­clu­sion of the agreement.

Schumer: In the first ten years of the deal, there are seri­ous weak­ness­es in the agree­ment. First, inspec­tions are not “any­where, anytime.”

Any agree­ment with any mem­ber of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a sig­na­to­ry of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is gov­erned by the Safeguards Agreement of the mem­ber state with the IAEA and its Additional Protocol. Nothing in both doc­u­ments indi­cates that the IAEA has the author­i­ty for “any­where, any­time” inspec­tions. The IAEA cur­rent­ly has access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites. The issue is not about access, but about any “sus­pi­cious sites” in the future. Demanding vis­its to sites that are not cov­ered by the inter­na­tion­al agree­ments and Iran’s oblig­a­tions will only add to the Islamic world’s per­cep­tion of the United State as a bul­ly that abides by the inter­na­tion­al laws only when it suits its inter­ests, but aban­dons them when the laws go against its wish­es. It will also strength­en the resolve of Iran’s hard­lin­ers who oppose the agreement.

At the same time, Iran is an old civ­i­liza­tion with a proud peo­ple who are fierce­ly nation­al­ist. Among all the Islamic nations of the Middle East and North Africa, Iran is also the only coun­try whose pop­u­la­tion is gen­er­al­ly pro-West “Anywhere, any­time” inspec­tion of Iran that is not part of Iran’s oblig­a­tions will pro­voke angry reac­tions by the Iranian nation who will con­sid­er them as infringe­ment on their nation’s sov­er­eign­ty. Why should we destroy such good will by demand­ing ille­gal vis­its that will not be nec­es­sary, or even con­tribute to pre­vent­ing Iran from devel­op­ing a nuclear arsenal?

Schumer: The 24-day delay before we can inspect is trou­bling. While inspec­tors would like­ly be able to detect radioac­tive iso­topes at a site after 24 days, that delay would enable Iran to escape detec­tion of any illic­it build­ing and improv­ing of pos­si­ble mil­i­tary dimen­sions (PMD) – the tools that go into build­ing a bomb but don’t emit radioac­tiv­i­ty.

The Senator mis­un­der­stands the cur­rent state-of-affairs regard­ing inspec­tion of Iran’s nuclear pro­gram. The IAEA inspec­tors are cur­rent­ly in Iran, tak­ing sam­ples, and vis­it­ing var­i­ous sites. It has and will have the most advanced tech­nol­o­gy to detect any­thing. Satellites are tak­ing pic­tures 247 and any “illic­it” build­ing is noticed. Iran is under the most intru­sive inspec­tion in the entire his­to­ry of the IAEA.

The Senator has also com­plete­ly mis­un­der­stood the PMD. This refers to alle­ga­tions that Iran car­ried out some nuclear weapon-relat­ed research in 2000 or ear­li­er using non-nuclear explo­sives. In addi­tion to the fact that the PMD remains unproven, there is no alle­ga­tion about any more recent work relat­ed to the PMD. So, if Iran were to “escape” the PMD, it has had ample time to do it by now.

Schumer: Even when we detect radioac­tiv­i­ty at a site where Iran is illic­it­ly advanc­ing its bomb-mak­ing capa­bil­i­ty, the 24-day delay would hin­der our abil­i­ty to deter­mine pre­cise­ly what was being done at that site.

This is pure­ly hyper­bole. Once the agree­ment goes into effect, the IAEA will have up to 150 inspec­tors on the ground, armed with the most sophis­ti­cat­ed tech­nol­o­gy, satel­lites, and oth­er intel­li­gence-gath­er­ing to mon­i­tor every­thing. But, there is also log­ic behind the 24 day peri­od: pre­vent­ing new base­less alle­ga­tions against Iran by a third par­ty whose whole pur­pose is scut­tling the agree­ment and over­whelm­ing the IAEA by as flood of base­less “evi­dence.” The IAEA must present con­vinc­ing evi­dence of an illic­it activ­i­ty, and the 24 days peri­od will allow estab­lish­ing the authen­tic­i­ty of the evi­dence, while Iran remains under strict inspection.

Schumer: Even more trou­bling is the fact that the US can­not demand inspec­tions uni­lat­er­al­ly. By requir­ing the major­i­ty of the 8‑member Joint Commission, and assum­ing that China, Russia, and Iran will not coöper­ate, inspec­tions would require the votes of all three European mem­bers of the P5+1 as well as the EU rep­re­sen­ta­tive. It is rea­son­able to fear that, once the Europeans become entan­gled in lucra­tive eco­nom­ic rela­tions with Iran, they may well be inclined not to rock the boat by vot­ing to allow inspec­tions.

The Senator has once again demon­strat­ed his igno­rance of inter­na­tion­al laws. This is not a bilat­er­al agree­ment between Iran and the United States. Thus, the US has no author­i­ty to demand any­thing uni­lat­er­al­ly. If the Senator is con­cerned that our allies will aban­don us once the agree­ment is kicked in, that says some­thing about the nature of the US accu­sa­tions against Iran, which have been too many, but almost none of which has turned out to be true.

Schumer: Additionally, the “snap­back” pro­vi­sions in the agree­ment seem cum­ber­some and dif­fi­cult to use. While the US could uni­lat­er­al­ly cause snap­back of all sanc­tions, there will be instances where it would be more appro­pri­ate to snap­back some but not all of the sanc­tions, because the vio­la­tion is sig­nif­i­cant but not severe. A par­tial snap­back of mul­ti­lat­er­al sanc­tions could be dif­fi­cult to obtain, because the US would require the coöper­a­tion of oth­er nations. If the US insists on snap­back of all the pro­vi­sions, which it can do uni­lat­er­al­ly, and the Europeans, Russians, or Chinese feel that is too severe a pun­ish­ment, they may not comply.

Let us assume that the Senator is right. What is his sug­ges­tion for get­ting around the “cum­ber­some” nature of the “snap­back” pro­vi­sion? The pro­vi­sion takes away the veto rights of Russia and China in the Security Council, a very sig­nif­i­cant con­ces­sion by Iran’s allies. At the same time, the world does not oper­ate the way the Senator wish­es, name­ly, if the US demands “jump,” the rest of the world would ask “how high.” This is a mul­ti­po­lar world.

Schumer: Supporters argue that after ten years, a future President would be in no weak­er a posi­tion than we are today to pre­vent Iran from rac­ing to the bomb. That argu­ment dis­counts the cur­rent sanc­tions régime. After fif­teen years of relief from sanc­tions, Iran would be stronger finan­cial­ly and bet­ter able to advance a robust nuclear pro­gram. Even more impor­tant­ly, the agree­ment would allow Iran, after ten to fif­teen years, to be a nuclear thresh­old state with the bless­ing of the world community.

First of all, there is no evi­dence that Iran actu­al­ly wants the bomb. To the con­trary, there ample evi­dence that it does not, and the US own intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty has expressed con­fi­dence in this asser­tion through its National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, reaf­firmed mul­ti­ple times since then, that Iran stopped com­plete­ly its nuclear weapon research pro­gram in 2003, assum­ing that it had one before then, although no evi­dence of the exis­tence of the pro­gram before 2003 has ever been publicized.

Secondly, Iran has been a de-fac­to nuclear thresh­old state for years. It has mas­tered the com­plete nuclear fuel cycle for pro­duc­ing enriched ura­ni­um. It has devel­oped the nec­es­sary cen­trifuge tech­nol­o­gy for the enrich­ment, and it has the nec­es­sary infra­struc­ture for a robust nuclear pro­gram. The key is to keep this poten­tial latent and under con­trol. Short of Iran capit­u­lat­ing and giv­ing up its entire nuclear infra­struc­ture akin to what Libya did – which will nev­er hap­pen – the best way to con­trol the pro­gram and keep its poten­tial latent is by engag­ing Iran.

Schumer: Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not clos­er to pos­sess­ing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the abil­i­ty to thwart Iran if it is intent on becom­ing a nuclear pow­er would have less moral and eco­nom­ic force.

The key world is “if,” but there is no evi­dence that Iran wants to be a nuclear-armed state. If it did have a nuclear weapon research pro­gram, we should ask why it was stopped in 2003: Because its arch­en­e­my, the régime of Saddam Hussein was top­pled that year and, there­fore, Iran no longer need­ed deter­rence against a régime that had used chem­i­cal weapons against its pop­u­la­tion. This also goes to show that, despite their rhetoric, the Iranian lead­ers con­sid­er nei­ther the United States nor Israel as the main threat to their coun­try. The fact that Iran did not retal­i­ate against Iraq by chem­i­cal weapons of its own is also a glar­ing evi­dence of its intention.

Schumer: If Iran’s true intent is to get a nuclear weapon, under this agree­ment, it must sim­ply exer­cise patience. After ten years, it can be very close to achiev­ing that goal, and, unlike its cur­rent unsanc­tioned pur­suit of a nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear pro­gram will be cod­i­fied in an agree­ment signed by the United States and oth­er nations. To me, after ten years, if Iran is the same nation as it is today, we will be worse off with this agree­ment than with­out it.

This state­ment is again based on a big “if” and the assump­tion that Iran does want a nuclear arse­nal. As for­mer IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei put it, we can­not mea­sure the “inten­tions” of a nation, but can only deal with facts on the ground, and the facts give us con­fi­dence that Iran does not want a nuclear weapon.

Schumer: In addi­tion, we must con­sid­er the non-nuclear ele­ments of the agree­ment. This aspect of the deal gives me the most pause. For years, Iran has used mil­i­tary force and ter­ror­ism to expand its influ­ence in the Middle East, active­ly sup­port­ing mil­i­tary or ter­ror­ist actions in Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. That is why the US has labeled Iran as one of only three nations in the world who are “state spon­sors of ter­ror­ism.” Under this agree­ment, Iran would receive at least $50 bil­lion dol­lars in the near future and would undoubt­ed­ly use some of that mon­ey to redou­ble its efforts to cre­ate even more trou­ble in the Middle East, and, per­haps, beyond.

First of all, the $50 bil­lion or so that Iran is to receive is its own mon­ey. No one is giv­ing Iran any gift or reward.

Second, as ter­ri­ble as the régime of President Bashar al-Assad may be, Iran has a legit­i­mate, inter­na­tion­al­ly-rec­og­nized mutu­al defense agreement with the gov­ern­ment of Syria, sim­i­lar to many sim­i­lar agree­ments that the United States has with many coun­tries, unlike the US allies that are inter­fer­ing there. If Iran is to be con­demned for inter­fer­ing in Syria, so should the US allies in that region. As Vice President Joe Biden made it clear last October in his speech at Harvard University, it was our allies in the region, Saudi Arabia, the Arab nations of Persian Gulf, and Turkey that turned the strug­gle for democ­ra­cy in Syria into a sec­tar­i­an Shiite-Sunni war. Iran cut off its sup­port for Hamas. Iran is allied with the cen­tral gov­ern­ment in Iraq, allies that came to pow­er demo­c­ra­t­i­cal­ly after the United States top­pled Saddam Hussein’s régime.Some Iraqi politi­cians believe that were it not for Iran, Baghdad would have fall­en to the Islamic State by now. There is no firm evi­dence that Iran has actu­al­ly inter­fered in Yemen. It is Saudi Arabia, a US ally, which has been bomb­ing defense­less civil­ians in Yemen, killing and injur­ing thou­sands of them.

Third, Iran has sup­port­ed its allies through thick and thin. When there were no sanc­tions against it, Iran sup­port­ed its allies, and con­tin­ued to do so dur­ing the tough sanc­tion years. But, there is no evi­dence that Iran will sud­den­ly increase dra­mat­i­cal­ly its sup­port for its allies.

Fourth and most impor­tant­ly, Iran needs the funds to shore up its econ­o­my, cre­ate jobs, invest in its infra­struc­ture, and address the aspi­ra­tions of 80 mil­lion high­ly edu­cat­ed Iranians, 65 per­cent of whom is under the age of 35. President Hassan Rouhani was elect­ed based on a plat­form of improv­ing the econ­o­my. If he does not deliv­er, he will not be re-elect­ed in 2017, if not top­pled ear­li­er by the hardliners.

Schumer: To reduce the pain of sanc­tions, the Supreme Leader had to lean left and bend to the mod­er­ates in his coun­try. It seems log­i­cal that to coun­ter­bal­ance, he will lean right and give the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and the hard­lin­ers resources so that they can pur­sue their num­ber one goal: strength­en­ing Iran’s armed forces and pur­su­ing even more harm­ful mil­i­tary and ter­ror­ist actions.

Quite the con­trary, the Supreme Leader is con­cerned about the sur­vival of his régime, which will not sur­vive if the econ­o­my does not improve dra­mat­i­cal­ly. Iran was near explo­sion dur­ing 2012 – 2013, when its econ­o­my was under huge dis­tress. Even the IRGC com­man­ders under­stand this, which is why they have sup­port­ed the agree­ment, even though their hard­line social base oppos­es the agreement.

Schumer: Finally, the hard­lin­ers can use the freed-up funds to build an ICBM on their own as soon as sanc­tions are lift­ed (and then aug­ment their ICBM capa­bil­i­ties in 8 years after the ban on import­ing bal­lis­tic weapon­ry is lift­ed), threat­en­ing the United States. Restrictions should have been put in place lim­it­ing how Iran could use its new resources.

Restricting Iran on how to spend its own mon­ey is tan­ta­mount to vio­lat­ing its sov­er­eign­ty. The United States has tried this route with many oth­er nations, and in each and every case, it has back­fired. In addi­tion, Iran is already quite advanced in its mis­sile pro­gram, despite the sanc­tions. Finally, what­ev­er Iran does for strength­en­ing its armed forces, is pure­ly for defen­sive pur­pos­es. For years, and most recent­ly in June, the Pentagon has report­ed to Congress that Iran’s mil­i­tary doc­trine is a pure­ly defen­sive one.

Schumer: When it comes to the non-nuclear aspects of the deal, I think there is a strong case that we are bet­ter off with­out an agree­ment than with one.

And, the alter­na­tive, in the absence of the agree­ment, is?

Schumer: Using the pro­po­nents’ over­all stan­dard – which is not whether the agree­ment is ide­al, but whether we are bet­ter with or with­out it – it seems to me, when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agree­ment with­in ten years, we might be slight­ly bet­ter off with it. However, when it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be bet­ter off with­out it.

And, the alter­na­tive, in the absence of the agree­ment, is? If the Senator is hop­ing for a “bet­ter” deal, it does not exist because it would entail Iran capit­u­lat­ing. That will not hap­pen, which means that there will be war. If that is what the Senator has in mind, he should say so explicitly.

Schumer: Ultimately, in my view, whether one sup­ports or oppos­es the res­o­lu­tion of dis­ap­proval depends on how one thinks Iran will behave under this agree­ment. If one thinks Iran will mod­er­ate, that con­tact with the West and a decrease in eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal iso­la­tion will soft­en Iran’s hard­line posi­tions, one should approve the agree­ment. After all, a mod­er­ate Iran is less like­ly to exploit holes in the inspec­tion and sanc­tions régime, is less like­ly to seek to become a thresh­old nuclear pow­er after ten years, and is more like­ly to use its new­found resources for domes­tic growth, not inter­na­tion­al adven­tur­ism.

While no one can pre­dict with absolute cer­tain­ty how Iran will be behav­ing in 10 – 15 years, one thing is absolute­ly cer­tain: no nation will mod­er­ate if there is threat to its sur­vival and nation­al secu­ri­ty. The biggest win­ners of inva­sion of Iraq by the United States and the con­stant threat of mil­i­tary attacks against Iran by the Bush admin­is­tra­tion and Israel have been Iran’s hard­lin­ers, who used the threat to con­sol­i­date their pow­er. The biggest win­ners of the eco­nom­ic sanc­tions against Iranhave also been its hard­lin­ers who enriched them­selves fab­u­lous­ly by con­trol­ling the black mar­ket. At the same time, only when the mid­dle class in a coun­try feel more secure about their eco­nom­ic well-being, it begins demand­ing more per­son­al, social, and polit­i­cal free­dom. Thus, Iran with a grow­ing econ­o­my is far more like­ly to become more mod­er­ate in its for­eign and domes­tic pol­i­cy, than when it is con­stant­ly under siege.

Schumer: Admittedly, no one can tell with cer­tain­ty which way Iran will go. It is true that Iran has a large num­ber of peo­ple who want their gov­ern­ment to decrease its iso­la­tion from the world and focus on eco­nom­ic advance­ment at home. But it is also true that this desire has been evi­dent in Iran for thir­ty-five years, yet the Iranian lead­ers have held a tight and undi­min­ished grip on Iran, suc­cess­ful­ly main­tain­ing their bru­tal, theo­crat­ic dic­ta­tor­ship with lit­tle threat. Who’s to say this dic­ta­tor­ship will not pre­vail for anoth­er ten, twen­ty, or thir­ty years?

One impor­tant rea­son that the aspi­ra­tions of Iranian peo­ple for a demo­c­ra­t­ic state have not been real­ized is that Iran has been, almost con­stant­ly, under sanc­tions by the United States since the 1979 Revolution, as well as the threat of mil­i­tary attacks by the US and its allies in the region. Only when the shad­ow of war and eco­nom­ic hard­ship is lift­ed, can a nation demand democ­ra­cy and take con­crete steps for achiev­ing it.

Schumer: To me, the very real risk that Iran will not mod­er­ate and will, instead, use the agree­ment to pur­sue its nefar­i­ous goals is too great.

Based on what evi­dence? Could the Senator pre­dict the elec­tion of the for­mer reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, or the mod­er­ate Hassan Rouhani in 2013, or the Green Movement in 2009? More than any oth­er nation in its region, Iran has all the pre­req­ui­sites for tran­si­tion­ing to a true democracy.

Schumer should recon­sid­er his posi­tion. If a war with Iran breaks out, the cur­rent wars in that region will be child’s play by com­par­i­son. The nuclear agree­ment will be good even for Israel’s secu­ri­ty. The cam­paign to defeat the agree­ment is con­cerned only with short­sight­ed par­ti­san pol­i­tics and moti­vat­ed by ide­ol­o­gy. The Senator should stop lis­ten­ing to the far right, and con­sid­er the nation­al inter­ests of the United States. Story orig­i­nat­ed here . Deconstructing Senator Chuck Schumer’s Pro-War Statement About the Iran Nuclear Deal