America’s Drug War Is Ruining The World

From our friends over at the Nation. And an in-depth look at the fal­la­cy of the American Drug war which has scooped up guilty and inno­cent alike, large­ly peo­ple of col­or while the real power­bro­kers behind the use and sale of dan­ger­ous drugs, white men gets off scot-free.

A half-century of Washington’s harsh drug prohibition policies has brought misery to millions across the globe. 

By Alfred McCoy

An opium field in Afghanistan

Afghan farm­ers har­vest raw opi­um in a pop­py field. (AP Photo /​Allauddin Khan)

We live in a time of change, when peo­ple are ques­tion­ing old assump­tions and seek­ing new direc­tions. In the ongo­ing debate over health care, social jus­tice, and bor­der secu­ri­ty, there is, how­ev­er, one over­looked issue that should be at the top of everyone’s agen­da, from demo­c­ra­t­ic social­ists to lib­er­tar­i­an Republicans: America’s longest war. No, not the one in Afghanistan. I mean the drug war.

For more than a cen­tu­ry, the US has worked through the UN (and its pre­de­ces­sor, the League of Nations) to build a harsh glob­al drug-pro­hi­bi­tion régime — ground­ed in dra­con­ian laws, enforced by per­va­sive polic­ing, and pun­ished with mass incar­cer­a­tion. For the past half-cen­tu­ry, the United States has also waged its own “war on drugs” that has com­pli­cat­ed its for­eign pol­i­cy, com­pro­mised its elec­toral democ­ra­cy, and con­tributed to social inequal­i­ty. Perhaps the time has final­ly come to assess the dam­age that drug war has caused and con­sid­er alternatives.

Even though I first made my mark with a 1972 book that the CIA tried to sup­press on the hero­in trade in Southeast Asia, it’s tak­en me most of my life to grasp all the com­plex ways this country’s drug war, from Afghanistan to Colombia, the Mexican bor­der to inner-city Chicago, has shaped American soci­ety. Last sum­mer, a French direc­tor doing a doc­u­men­tary inter­viewed me for sev­en hours about the his­to­ry of illic­it nar­cotics. As we moved from the 17th cen­tu­ry to the present and from Asia to America, I found myself try­ing to answer the same relent­less ques­tion: What had 50 years of obser­va­tion actu­al­ly drilled into me, beyond some ran­dom facts, about the char­ac­ter of the illic­it traf­fic in drugs?

At the broad­est lev­el, the past half-cen­tu­ry turns out to have taught me that drugs aren’t just drugs, drug deal­ers aren’t just “push­ers,” and drug users aren’t just “junkies” (that is, out­casts of no con­se­quence). Illicit drugs are major glob­al com­modi­ties that con­tin­ue to influ­ence US pol­i­tics, both nation­al and inter­na­tion­al. And our drug wars cre­ate prof­itable covert nether­worlds in which those very drugs flour­ish and become even more prof­itable. Indeed, the UN once esti­mat­ed that the transna­tion­al traf­fic, which sup­plied drugs to 4.2 per­cent of the world’s adult pop­u­la­tion, was a $400 bil­lion indus­try, the equiv­a­lent of 8 per­cent of glob­al trade.

In ways that few seem to under­stand, illic­it drugs have had a pro­found influ­ence on mod­ern America, shap­ing our inter­na­tion­al pol­i­tics, nation­al elec­tions, and domes­tic social rela­tions. Yet a feel­ing that illic­it drugs belong to a mar­gin­al­ized demi­monde has made US drug pol­i­cy the sole prop­er­ty of law enforce­ment and not health care, edu­ca­tion, or urban development.

During this process of reflec­tion, I’ve returned to three con­ver­sa­tions I had back in 1971 when I was a 26-year-old grad­u­ate stu­dent research­ing that first book of mine,The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. In the course of an 18-month odyssey around the globe, I met three men, deeply involved in the drug wars, whose words I was then too young to ful­ly absorb.

The first was Lucien Conein, a “leg­endaryCIA oper­a­tive whose covert career ranged from para­chut­ing into North Vietnam in 1945 to train com­mu­nist guer­ril­las with Ho Chi Minh to orga­niz­ing the CIA coup that killed South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. In the course of our inter­view at his mod­est home near CIA head­quar­ters in Langley, Virginia, he laid out just how the Agency’s oper­a­tives, like so many Corsican gang­sters, prac­ticed the “clan­des­tine arts” of con­duct­ing com­plex oper­a­tions beyond the bounds of civ­il soci­ety and how such “arts” were, in fact, the heart and soul of both covert oper­a­tions and the drug trade.

Second came Colonel Roger Trinquier, whose life in a French drug nether­world extend­ed from com­mand­ing para­troop­ers in the opi­um-grow­ing high­lands of Vietnam dur­ing the First Indochina War of the ear­ly 1950s to serv­ing as deputy to General Jacques Massu in his cam­paign of mur­der and tor­ture in the Battle of Algiers in 1957. During an inter­view in his ele­gant Paris apart­ment, Trinquier explained how he helped fund his own para­troop oper­a­tions through Indochina’s illic­it opi­um traf­fic. Emerging from that inter­view, I felt almost over­whelmed by the aura of Nietzschean omnipo­tence that Trinquier had clear­ly gained from his many years in this shad­owy realm of drugs and death.

My last men­tor on the sub­ject of drugs was Tom Tripodi, a covert oper­a­tive who had trained Cuban exiles in Florida for the CIA’s 1961 Bay of Pigs inva­sion and then, in the late 1970s, pen­e­trat­ed mafia net­works in Sicily for the US Drug Enforcement Administration. In 1971, he appeared at my front door in New Haven, Connecticut, iden­ti­fied him­self as a senior agent for the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Narcotics, and insist­ed that the bureau was wor­ried about my future book. Rather ten­ta­tive­ly, I showed him just a few draft pages of my man­u­script for The Politics of Heroin, and he prompt­ly offered to help me make it as accu­rate as pos­si­ble. During lat­er vis­its, I would hand him chap­ters and he would sit in a rock­ing chair, shirt sleeves rolled up, revolver in his shoul­der hol­ster, scrib­bling cor­rec­tions and telling remark­able sto­ries about the drug trade — like the time his bureau found that French intel­li­gence was pro­tect­ing the Corsican syn­di­cates smug­gling hero­in into New York City. Far more impor­tant, though, through him I grasped how ad hoc alliances between crim­i­nal traf­fick­ers and the CIA reg­u­lar­ly helped both the Agency and the drug trade prosper.

Looking back, I can now see how those vet­er­an oper­a­tives were each describ­ing to me a clan­des­tine polit­i­cal domain, a covert nether­world in which gov­ern­ment agents, mil­i­tary men, and drug traders were freed from the shack­les of civ­il soci­ety and empow­ered to form secret armies, over­throw gov­ern­ments, and even, per­haps, kill a for­eign president.

At its core, this nether­world was then and remains today an invis­i­ble polit­i­cal realm inhab­it­ed by crim­i­nal actors and prac­ti­tion­ers of Conein’s “clan­des­tine arts.” Offering some sense of the scale of this social milieu, in 1997 the United Nations report­ed that transna­tion­al crime syn­di­cates had 3.3 mil­lion mem­bers world­wide who traf­ficked in drugs, arms, humans, and endan­gered species. Meanwhile, dur­ing the Cold War, all the major pow­ers — Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States — deployed expand­ed clan­des­tine ser­vices world­wide, mak­ing covert oper­a­tions a cen­tral facet of geopo­lit­i­cal pow­er. The end of the Cold War has in no way changed this real­i­ty.

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